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VMware MVP: What it really is


Recently I had a look at what has become of VMware’s MVP and explained the security shortcomings of the Type-2 hypervisor design. Today I’m looking at VWware’s approach in more detail, and explain why it is in fact not a real Type-2 hypervisor, and what this implies.

Type-2 hypervisors are known for poor performance. The reason I had explained in detail a while back, I’ll summarise them here (refer to the earlier blog for more details).

Type-1 (left) 4 mode, 2 context switches, Type-2 (right) 8 mode, 4 context switches

Virtualization mechanics in Type-1 and -2 hypervisors

A system call performed by an application is a privileged operation which is intercepted by the hypervisor, which (after deciding that this is an operation which should be handled by the guest) forwards it to the guest OS. The return to user mode from the guest takes a similar detour through the hypervisor, as indicated in the left part of the diagram.

In the case of a Type-1 hypervisor, this results in a total of four mode switches and two context switches. However, in the case of a Type-2 hypervisor, the system call is trapped by the host OS, which delivers it to the hypervisor, and a return from the hypervisor to either the guest or the app similarly takes a detour via the host. All up, the number of mode switches and context switches is doubled, as indicated in the right part of the diagram. Further cost arises from the fact that while a Type-1 hypervisor (such as OKL4) is highly optimised for this trampolining, the host OS generally isn’t. In reality, the overhead of doing a simple system call is in the Type-2 case not just double that of the Type-1, but closer to an order of magnitude higher. This is why virtualization with a Type-2 hypervisor is generally slow. Note that ARM’s forthcoming architecture extensions to support virtualization (I’ll discuss them in a future blog) help to reduce the overheads of a Type-1 hypervisor, but do little to help a Type-2.

VMware understands this, and has taken a different approach in MVP, which I’ll explain now.

Fundamentally, the high cost of Type-2 virtualization stems from the fact that the hypervisor effectively consists of two parts, the host OS and the hypervisor proper, that each (logical) hypervisor invocation bounces twice between those layers, and that the host mechanisms used for this bouncing are inefficient. So, what VMware does in MVP is to merge the hypervsior back in with the host.

Hybrid hypervisor adds kernel module to host and runs guest VM like normal app

Hybrid hypervisor

This is done by loading a MVP module (called “MVPkm”) into the host OS kernel, as shown in the diagram to the right. (They discuss this for Android, it is not clear whether they plan to support other hosts, such as Windows or Symbian. If they do, they’ll have to redo the kernel module for each host.) The MVP module effectively hijacks the host, by re-writing the exception vectors, so it obtains control whenever the guest kernel is entered. (Note: this is exactly what a piece of malware would do.) The process turns the host kernel into a hypervisor.

The result is not really a Type-2 hypervisor any more, as it actually runs native, not on top of a host OS (but inside) and has direct control over physical resources (rather than the virtualized resources provided to it by the host). However, it it isn’t a Type-1 hypervisor either, as it does not have exclusive control over the hardware, this is shared with the rest of the host, and any code inside the host kernel can interfere with the operation of the hypervisor module.

So, if this hypervisor is neither a Type-2 nor a Type-1, what is it? I call it a hybrid hypervisor, as it is somewhat of a blend of the two basic types. A better-known representative of the hybrid hypervisor type is the widely-used KVM (often falsely referred to as a Type-2 hypervisor). It operates very similarly, although KVM is dependent on virtualizaiton extensions to the architecture (MVP is not, but can make use of them).

The hybrid hypervisor can achieve similar performance as a Type-1 hypervisor, so this scheme seems pretty neat at first glance. The problem is that this performance is bought at a heavy price.

The one advantage a Type-2 hypervisor has over a Type-1 is that it can be easily installed: for the host OS it’s just another app, and it is installed just like an app, without requiring any special privileges.

This advantage is lost with the hybrid approach. It requires inserting a kernel module into the host OS, which is a highly security-critical operation (after all, it is the same as installing a root kit into the kernel!) As such it requires special privileges. On a mobile phone it requires cooperation with the device vendor or network operator, as they try very hard to prevent the unauthorised insertion of malware-like code into the OS!

While losing the ease-of-install advantage of the Type-2 to buy Type-1-like performance, the hybrid hypervisor inherits all the other drawbacks of the Type-2 hypervisor, especially the huge size of the trusted computing base. Everything in the host OS (all of a million or so lines of code!) needs to be trusted, a huge attack surface. So, while MVP is a hybrid hypervisor rather than a real Type-2, everything about the drawbacks of VMware’s approach I discussed in the earlier blog and its successor remains valid!

In summary, the hybrid approach taken with MVP has no discernible advantage over a lightweight, high-performance Type-1 hypervisor such as OKL4. MVP still requires manufacturer/MNO cooperation to install (unlike a real Type-2). It can, in theory, reach the performance of OKL4, although I’ll believe that when I see it, given that OKL4’s performance is so much better than anything else I’ve seen. But the fundamental weakness of the hybrid approach, which it shares with proper Type-2 hypervisors, is that it adds nothing to security of the guest apps, they are every bit as exposed as if they were running directly on the host. Which begs the question: Why bother?

Speaking of attacks, if you think carefully about it, you realise that MVP might very well increase the exposure of handsets to malware. Put yourselves in the shoes of a blackhat and think about how to get a rootkit onto a handset. If you know that a handset is provisioned to have MVP loaded on it, you know that it has provision for loading the MVP kernel module. It might well be that the easiest way to crack the system is to write a rootkit module which masquerades as MVPkm. I’ll sure stay away from such phones!

In a future blog I will investigate how each type of hypervisor does (or doesn’t) support the various use cases for mobile virtualization. Stay tuned, and drop me a line if you have questions.

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  1. Hey VMware: Secure It Ain’t! « microkerneldude

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